Ruling:

I. The requests for the protection of legality are partially granted, and the challenged final judgment regarding the convicted B. B. is annulled concerning the decisions on the property claim and the costs of the criminal proceedings regarding the decision on the property claim, and the case is returned to the court of first instance for a new decision in this scope.

II. The request is rejected in the remaining part.

Explanation:

A.

1. The District Court in Ljubljana, under item I/1 of the operative part of the judgment dated 9 October 2020, found A.A. and the convicted B.B. guilty of the criminal offenses of abuse of position or trust in economic activity under the first and second paragraphs of Article 240 in conjunction with Article 20 of the Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as KZ-1). Under item I/2 of the operative part, the convicted B.B. was found guilty of the criminal offense of money laundering under the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 245 of the KZ-1. A.A. was sentenced to one year and three months in prison, while B.B. was sentenced to one year and six months in prison for the offense under item I/1, eight months in prison for the offense under item I/2, and a fine of EUR 4,000.00. The court imposed a unified sentence of two years in prison and a fine of EUR 4,000.00. The court also decided on the costs of the criminal proceedings (item III of the operative part). A.A. and B.B. were jointly ordered to pay the amount of EUR 690,753.85, plus statutory default interest from 9 June 2010 onwards, and the surplus of the property claim of the injured company A. d.d. was referred to a civil lawsuit (item IV of the operative part). Under item B of the operative part, C.C. and D.D. were acquitted of the charges against them, with the consequences regarding the costs of the criminal proceedings and the property claim of the injured company being decided accordingly. By a corrective ruling dated 1 July 2021, certain discrepancies between the written abrogation of the judgment and the operative part of the announced judgment were rectified.

2. The Higher Court in Ljubljana, in its decision dated 27 January 2022, partially granting the appeal of the defense counsel A.A., partially granting the appeal of the district state prosecutor, and ex officio amending the judgment of the court of first instance, acquitted A.A. of the charges under the second and first paragraphs of Article 240 in conjunction with Article 20 of the KZ-1, based on the grounds of the first point of Article 358 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ZKP). This had consequences for the amendment of the decisions on the costs of the criminal proceedings and the property claim in relation to A.A. Regarding the convicted B.B., the Higher Court amended the judgment of the court of first instance in terms of the legal definition, the determined ancillary pecuniary penalty, and the imposed unified sentence under item I/1 of the operative part, defining the offense as an offense under the second and first paragraphs of Article 240 of the KZ-1 and increasing the ancillary pecuniary penalty to 200 daily amounts, which, at the unchanged daily amount, amounts to EUR 8,000.00. Regarding C.C., the court quashed the judgment and referred the case back to the court of first instance for a new trial before a completely different panel. In the remaining parts, the appeal of the district state prosecutor was rejected, and the appeal of the defense counsel of the convicted B.B. was rejected in its entirety, confirming the judgment of the court of first instance in its unchanged and unquashed parts. The convicted B.B. was ordered to pay court costs in the amount of EUR 4,597.50 as the cost of the appeal proceedings.

3. The defense counsel filed a request for protection of legality against the guilty verdict concerning the convicted B.B., citing significant violations of provisions of the criminal procedure, violations of the criminal law, and violations of constitutional rights. The defense counsel requested that the Supreme Court amend the final judgment by acquitting the defendant and, in the alternative, annul the judgments of the lower courts in the disputed part and remand the case to the court of first instance for a new trial before a completely different panel.

4. The Chief State Prosecutor Mirjam Kline, in response to the request for protection of legality, proposed that the Supreme Court reject the request as unfounded.

B.

5. The defense counsel states at the outset that "a large part of the defense's arguments in the appellate judgment remained completely unanswered," which, according to the defense, constitutes a fundamental violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure under the 11th point of the first paragraph of Article 371 of the ZKP. Firstly, if the appellate court fails to address the arguments raised in the appeal to which it should respond (not generalized, irrelevant, or obviously unfounded arguments), according to established case law1, this does not constitute a procedural violation of an absolute nature but, at most, a violation under the second paragraph of Article 371 in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 395 of the ZKP, where the applicant for the protection of legality must demonstrate the impact of the violation on the legality of the court decision (the third point of the first paragraph of Article 420 of the ZKP). Secondly, every alleged violation from the first paragraph of Article 420 of the ZKP must be clearly and specifically specified and substantiated in the request, substantiating the reasons for the alleged violation, which corresponds to the principle of dispositiveness of extraordinary legal remedies2 (the first paragraph of Article 424 of the ZKP). Since the request remains entirely generalized in the last paragraph on page 4, as it does not even specify which arguments of the appeal were left unanswered by the appellate court, it is not possible to assess such an allegation presented in such a manner. However, to the extent that the applicant is more specific in certain parts of the request, his concerns will be addressed when reviewing other alleged violations below.
B-1.

6. The defense counsel argues that the lower courts incorrectly applied the substantive (criminal) law by allowing criminal legal intervention against the defendant. In doing so, they recognized criminal legal protection for the injured company A. d.d., which was itself involved in illegal legal transactions, thus violating the principle of legality under Article 28 of the Constitution. The "parking" of shares of B. d.d. (MER) with A. d.d. constitutes the participation of the injured company in financing the purchase of its own shares, which is prohibited under Articles 240 and 241 of the Companies Act (ZGD) and the currently applicable provisions of Articles 247 and 248 of the ZGD-1. By committing to cover the costs of "parking" the shares, company B. d.d. agreed to provide unauthorized financial assistance in acquiring its own shares, and such a legal transaction is void. The agreement between the managements of both companies (E.E. and A.A.) for the injured company to participate in the described manner in the management takeover is illegal, and therefore company A. d.d. could not have suffered damage in the amount of EUR 690,753.85, which represents the unpaid costs of its transactions involving MER shares. This constitutes a violation of the principle of legality since, in this constellation, the statutory elements of the offense under Article 240 of the KZ-1 cannot be fulfilled.

7. The defense counsel's arguments cannot be accepted. The protected legal interest in the criminal offense of the so-called managerial offense under Article 240 of the KZ-1 is the property interest of the economic entity in which the perpetrator acts, and the corporate property is protected against unlawful acts in the economy.3 The offense criminalizes disloyal business conduct towards the company or its owners, while the actions of the perpetrator, which are not in the interest of the company, represent an attack on the internal (especially property)4 security of the economic entity and, consequently, on the interests of stakeholders involved in the corporate property substrate.5 In this case, the defendant is essentially accused of acting against the interests of company A. d.d. as a management cadre in a manner contrary to the interests of the company, with the intention and purpose of causing significant financial damage to the company. The amount of EUR 690,753.85 represents the costs incurred by company A. d.d. due to the conclusion of forward contracts (i.e., the purchase of MER shares) with Banka Koper, Gorenjska Banka, and Hypo Alpe Adria Bank.6 In accordance with the concluded option or forward contracts between companies B. d.d. and A. d.d., company B. d.d. undertook to cover these costs, all with the aim of using company A. d.d. as a "parking lot" for MER shares, which it bought from various stakeholders, primarily banks, and then sold them to other companies connected to the planned management takeover of the target company B. d.d.7

8. The defense counsel's position that company A. d.d. participated in the acquisition of its own shares in company B. d.d. is legally incorrect. From the description of the criminal offense and the reasons of the final judgment, it is evident that the "parking" of shares was intended for the management takeover, which means that it did not involve the acquisition of shares on behalf of and in the interest of company B. d.d. In other words, the MER shares purchased by company A. d.d. were subsequently sold to other companies, not to company B. d.d. as its own shares.8 Therefore, the defense counsel's reference to Articles 247 and 248 of the ZGD-1 (Articles 240 and 241 of the ZGD) in relation to the third paragraph of Article 248 of the ZGD-1 (the third paragraph of Article 241 of the ZGD) and Article 251 of the ZGD-1 (the fourth paragraph of Article 244 of the ZGD), which address aspects of acquiring own shares through third parties, is not relevant. The higher court's reasoning should also be understood in this regard,10 stating that company A. d.d. acquired the MER shares for its own account and with its own funds, not on behalf of (and for the benefit of) company B. d.d. The "friendly services" provided to the management of company B. d.d., specifically E.E., who agreed to cover the costs incurred by company A. d.d. due to the "parking" of MER shares, cannot be equated with the interests of company B. d.d. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the applicant, E.E., in his capacity as the CEO of company B. d.d., has already been finally convicted for his actions.

9. The contractual obligations of company B. d.d. to reimburse company A. d.d. for the costs associated with the acquisition of MER shares could be subsumed under the provision of the first paragraph of Article 248 of the Companies Act (ZGD-1) (Article 241 of the Companies Act), which establishes a nullity sanction for a legal transaction through which a company provides an advance or loan to a third party for the acquisition of its own shares or for another legal transaction with a comparable effect. This enacts the prohibition of financial assistance by a company in acquiring its own shares, which should be interpreted broadly according to the doctrine of commercial law. Specifically, any economic support for the acquisition of shares of the same company is prohibited, as it reduces its assets without showing a corresponding consideration (in its own shares). This broad interpretation of prohibited transactions was already accepted prior to the inclusion of the phrase "comparable legal transactions" in the Companies Act amendment (ZGD-1A), and this change should be attributed to its pedagogical explanatory significance.

10. In the present case, whether the (binding) legal transactions concluded between companies B. d.d. and A. d.d., including the agreement to pay the costs of transactions involving MER shares, can be recognized as void legal transactions from a civil law perspective is not crucial for assessing the criminal liability of the defendant and the fulfillment of the legal elements of the alleged criminal offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code (KZ-1). Any nullity sanction for the contractual obligations of company B. d.d. means "only" that company G. d.d. could not demand reimbursement of the costs (not even with a legal claim). If company B. d.d. had already fulfilled its contractual obligations, company G. d.d. would be obliged to return what it had received based on void contracts (Article 87(1) of the Obligations Code). The reduction of company A. d.d.'s assets occurred when it paid the costs associated with legitimate transactions to the sellers of the shares (various banks as intermediaries), which it could not recover. The involvement of the management of company G. d.d. in unlawful transactions with the management of company B. d.d., whether it pertains to the previously accused A. A. or the convicted B. B., does not mean that harm could not have occurred to company A. d.d.; on the contrary, the company was harmed precisely because of the illegal actions of the management cadre, which acted contrary to its property interests and indirectly the interests of the shareholders (principals) of the company.

11. Property damage occurred to the company due to its involvement in the management takeover of company B. d.d., and ultimately, it is not essential whether the costs were not covered because the funds intended for that purpose were redirected to the Liechtenstein company D. or because of the nullity of the legal transactions with company B. d.d. The defendant's conduct, as described in the guilt statement of the final judgment, which manifested his harmful intent, illustrates the actions of an agent disloyal to the principal, which justifies his (both criminal and civil) liability and does not exclude it. The demand's proposition that due to the unlawful actions of the management cadre, who reduced the company's assets with unlawful motives without showing corresponding consideration (and no corresponding performance ever occurred), the injured company should not be recognized as a victim in criminal proceedings is unacceptable and inherently illogical. This would circumvent the fundamental content of the criminal offense of abuse of position or trust in economic activity under Article 240 of the Penal Code, where the unlawfulness of the perpetrator's conduct is reflected in violations of obligations and prohibitions governing the relationship between the perpetrator and the economic entity in which they operate. Therefore, within the framework outlined by the petitioner, there is no basis to claim the absence of the legal elements of the criminal offense or a violation of the principle of legality.

12. The intention to cause property damage or obtain a financial benefit is alternatively specified as subjective legal elements of the criminal offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code, and the offense is satisfied if the perpetrator acts with one of these intentions, either harmful or self-interested; their contents often overlap but are not necessarily the same. In the present case, the defendant is accused of acting with the intention of causing (significant) property damage to company A. d.d. By transferring the amount of EUR 815,000.00 to company D., including the amount of EUR 690,753.85 that company A. d.d. was supposed to receive as reimbursement for costs, the motive behind the defendant's actions as the economic beneficiary of company D., the recipient of an unlawful financial benefit, is further illuminated. The defense counsel's unfounded claim that the final judgment constitutes a "surprise verdict" (violation of the defendant's right to defense under Article 29 of the Constitution) because the lower courts mentioned the defendant's self-interested intention is incorrect. In the third count of the indictment, the prosecution accused the defendant of acting with the intention to obtain an unlawful financial benefit for company D., which means that the defendant could defend himself against such an accusation. Due to the modifications in the description of the criminal offense and the legal classification, the trial court omitted the allegation of self-interested intent from the operative part of the judgment, thereby reducing the criminal accusation against the defendant. The alleged violations of the right to defense and the right to a legal remedy (Article 25 of the Constitution) are not substantiated.

13. The trial court justified that the defendant committed the criminal offense under point I/1 with direct (colored) intent, namely, with a specific intention to cause property damage to company A. d.d. or to inflict (significant) property damage to the company. It also justified the guilty verdict of the defendant regarding the criminal offense under point I/2 of the operative part. The motives that allegedly led the defendant to commit the criminal acts do not constitute (subjective) legal elements of the offenses under Articles 240 and 245 of the Penal Code, and the petitioner does not specify what they understand by the term "motives." The content of motives or reasons is not the same as the content of colored intent (intention), and reasoning about indeterminate facts is not part of the justification of the judgment, as implied by the petitioner. The motive or motivation as the "psychological impulse" for forming the intent in the commission of a criminal offense at most enables a more precise recognition of the content of the perpetrator's intentional attitude. However, as previously stated, the motivation of the defendant, which resulted in the transfer of EUR 815,000.00 to company D. (the defendant ultimately even disposed of these funds as the economic beneficiary of the company), is still present and explained in the reasoning of the final judgment, which is not contrary to the guilt statement.

B-2.

14. The petitioner claims that the agreement for company B. d.d. to cover the costs of "parking" MER shares with company A. d.d. was exclusively concluded between the former CEOs of the companies, E. E. and A. A. Neither C. C. nor the convicted B. B. were involved in such an agreement. The latter acted solely based on instructions received from the superior CEO, A. A., to which he was bound and executed the assigned task. E. E. and A. A. were the ones who negotiated the alternative method of cost settlement, namely by transferring funds amounting to EUR 815,000.00 to company D. Since the convicted B. B. did not give any instructions, the courts should have acquitted him of the charge under Article 240 of the Penal Code (KZ-1). By not doing so, they violated the principle of legality in criminal law as stated in Article 28 of the Constitution. In relation to this, there is also a contradiction between the operative part and the reasoning of both contested judgments (a substantial violation of provisions of the criminal procedure under Article 371(1)(11) of the Criminal Procedure Act (ZKP)).

15. As the director of finance and economics (and later also for IT) in the affected company, the defendant had authority to make decisions within the parent organizational area. In his defense, he did not mention that he was required to act according to instructions from the CEO that he could not or should not resist. From the reasons stated in the judgment, it is clear that the defendant was aware of the existence of an (unlawful) agreement between E. E. and A. A. regarding the "parking" of MER shares, as documented in four option and forward contracts, including the obligation for company B. d.d. to cover the transaction costs of the shares. The defendant was the one who negotiated with C. C. on the B. side or C. company regarding the updating of cost records, the amount, and methods of cost repayment. The defendant initialled the option contract dated May 24, 2004, and also participated in the transfer of entitlements from the aforementioned contract to company E. d.o.o. In the context of fulfilling the forward contract dated May 22, 2007, the defendant prepared an offer to Gorenjska Bank for the purchase of 84,955 lots of MER shares on behalf of company A. d.d. He also initialled the forward contract with Hypo Alpe Adria Bank dated February 7, 2007, for the purchase of 21,622 lots of MER shares. He subsequently negotiated with C. C. regarding the sale of shares to companies C. d.o.o. and B. d.d. and initialed the concluded contracts in connection with this. The amount of EUR 690,753.85 that company B. d.d. allegedly owed to company A. d.d. from cost calculations was based on the calculation prepared by the defendant. The defendant engaged in intensive discussions with C. C. on how B. would settle this amount. On December 16, 2009, C. C. submitted a draft option contract, according to which company B. d.d. was supposed to fulfill its debt to company D. in Liechtenstein; however, as stated in the findings of the final judgment, the content of the contract was entirely false. After receiving C. C.'s comments (regarding the division of payment between company B. d.d. and C. d.o.o.), he amended the draft contract and submitted it for review. In February 2010, the fictitious option contracts translated into English were sent for signature to F. F., the representative of company D. On May 24, 2010, the head of treasury at company B. d.d., G. G., provided account transfer information for EUR 815,000.00, urging prompt payment. The defendant also communicated regarding the transfer with representatives in Liechtenstein, giving them instructions according to the mandate agreement.

16. The appellate court affirmed the evidentiary conclusions of the trial court that the defendant was well aware that he was involved in redirecting funds from the company he should have represented to another company of which he himself was the economic beneficiary. He knew that he was participating in unlawful transactions, including the execution of fictitious option contracts with company D. The defense's arguments that the defendant was merely following instructions from his superior are not supported by personal and documentary evidence. The entire process was managed and implemented by the defendant as an adult and accountable person who independently made the decision to participate in the criminal act, and thus, the reference to "following orders" does not exclude the defendant's criminal liability. The Supreme Court accepts such reasoning and adds that despite E. E. and A. A. being the apparent spiritus agens, the defendant knowingly and intentionally participated in a chain of events that led to the harm to company A. d.d., and with his actions fulfilled the elements of the criminal offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code. As the director of finance and economics, he independently managed the parent organizational area, and he could undoubtedly and should have resisted any instructions received. However, he did not do so, as he intentionally committed the alleged criminal offense, fully aware of his role in the unlawful activity. According to the Supreme Court's assessment, which was also the conclusion of the higher court, the petitioner challenges the evidentiary conclusions of the final judgment with different views, thereby asserting an incorrect establishment of the factual situation, which is not a permissible reason to file a request for the protection of legality (second paragraph of Article 420 of the ZKP).

17. Contrary to the second paragraph of Article 420 of the ZKP, the arguments presented in the petition, where the petitioner repeats the defendant's defense, are also unfounded. First, that the disputed claims of company A. d.d. against company B. d.d. from the "parking" of MER shares were settled through a system of mutual approval called "superrabats," and second, that the funds transferred to company D. were intended for the volleyball club F. as the economic beneficiary of that company. It should be noted that such claims contradict the initial contradiction in the defense, where the defendant stated that company B. d.d. covered the outstanding mutual financial obligations with sponsorship funds, specifically between 700,000 and 800,000 EUR. This does not imply that company B. d.d.'s obligations to company A. d.d. were already settled with superrabats. Furthermore, the lower courts have refuted both aspects of the defendant's defense with reasonable and well-founded reasons. The defendant did propose certain operations involving superrabats to C. C., but when negotiating the fulfillment of company D.'s debt, C. C. responded that they "did not come together with superrabats." This is a logical statement since companies B. d.d. and C. d.o.o. subsequently transferred the total amount of EUR 815,000.00 to company D. The trial court provided further clarification that the superrabat system was not directly related to the costs of privatizing company B. d.d. or the costs of "parking" MER shares, and the higher court agreed with the factual findings. Regarding the petitioner's different assessment of the testimonies of witnesses H. H. and I. I. and the (inconsiderately generalized) reference to the "extensive documentary evidence," such claims do not succeed as they only allege procedural violations without merit.

18. The trial court provided extensive reasoning in support of the evidentiary conclusion that F. was never the "actual economic beneficiary" of company D., and the higher court accepted the evidentiary conclusions of the trial court. Neither the financial officer nor the board member of F., H. H., had any knowledge that the club established a legal entity abroad for trading in securities. Similarly, according to the testimony of the club's director, Grilanc, there was no information about a foreign legal entity or the club engaging in share trading in any business documentation. There was no testimony from the representative of company D., F. F., or the Liechtenstein courier J. J., indicating that F. was the volleyball club and the economic beneficiary. Furthermore, F. did not receive any transferred funds, and if a sponsorship donation of such magnitude, exceeding the annual budget, had been agreed upon, the club's management would undoubtedly have been aware of it. The defendant's defense that the amount of EUR 90,000.00 handed over by the courier J. J. on October 23, 2010 (guilty plea under point I/2) was handed over to K. K. for the needs of F., was refuted by the finding that K. K. had died more than two years before (in 2008). The remaining funds amounting to EUR 720,000.00 were transferred on September 10, 2010, in favor of company E. d.o.o., not F.

19. In light of the above, the defense argument that, according to Liechtenstein legislation, a sports club cannot be the economic beneficiary of a company, rendering the "formal" economic beneficiaries, the defendant and A. A., irrelevant, is unfounded. It is incorrect to claim that the trial court did not address this part of the defense, as explicitly stated in point 80 of the first-instance judgment, the defense and the defense theory were explicitly rejected. The appellate court, with its given reasons for accepting the evidentiary conclusions regarding the lack of connection between F. and company D., simultaneously rejected the repeated defense theory at the appellate level. For the assessment of the allegations addressed to the defendant in this criminal case, any further discussion regarding the (in)transparency of the establishment of company D. is completely irrelevant.

20. The criticism that the content of E. E.'s testimony, which mentioned agreements that company B. d.d. should sponsor stakeholders associated with company A. d.d. in the local community, is not addressed in the reasons of the final judgment is incorrect. The trial court already evaluated this part of E. E.'s testimony as "very vague and general" and as an attempt to exonerate the originally accused A. A. The evaluation of the evidence revealed that B. never sponsored F., and the Supreme Court is bound by the established factual findings when assessing the request for legal protection. The trial court clearly stated that E. E.'s testimony indicating sponsorship was not followed, as there was no consistency between the testimony and other evidence that refuted the defense in this regard. The higher court's reasoning reflects the same conclusion. The assertion of a substantial violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure under Article 371(1)(11) of the Criminal Procedure Act (ZKP) merely expresses disagreement with the evidentiary assessment of the testimonies of the witnesses, which is contrary to Article 420(2) of the ZKP. The trial court's evaluation of E. E.'s testimony as convincing, as it is consistent with other evidence, and its non-following of E. E.'s statement regarding F.'s sponsorship, does not reveal any internal contradiction in the reasoning of the judgment. The court provided a reasonable explanation as to why it assessed E. E.'s testimony in a specific part as not credible. The principle of free evaluation of evidence (Article 18(1) and Article 355(2) of the ZKP) does not prevent a psychological assessment of evidence, which is not limited by formal rules of evidence, from encompassing a value judgment of individual statements of the same participant in the proceedings (witness), as accepted by the trial court. The petitioner unjustifiably overlooks the specific determination of this apparent fact of evidence law in the reasoning of the appellate court's judgment.

B-3.

21. The petitioner further claims that the lower courts, by rejecting the defense's evidence proposals, burdened the final judgment with a substantial violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure under the second paragraph of Article 371 of the ZKP, which "in itself necessarily affects the unlawfulness of the judicial decision." They thereby encroached on the defendant's right to defense (to present exonerating evidence in favor of the accused) under the third indent of Article 29 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR. The defense provided a detailed explanation of the legal relevance of the proposed evidence and substantiated it with the necessary degree of probability. The evidence proposals include: (1) examination of witness L. L.; (2) examination of witness M. M.; (3) examination of stockbrokers from Hypo Bank d.d.

22. The petitioner will succeed in asserting violations of convention and constitutional rights due to the rejection of evidence proposals if, in deciding on the evidence proposals, the court does not adhere to the (constitutional) judicial practice already established: (1) in accordance with the principle of free evaluation of evidence, the court itself decides which evidence to present and how to assess its credibility; (2) the court is not obliged to present every piece of evidence proposed by the defense; (3) the evidence must be legally relevant, i.e., relevant; (4) the defense must substantiate the existence and legal relevance of the proposed evidence with the necessary degree of probability; (5) in doubt, every evidence proposal is in favor of the accused and the court must present it unless it is evident that the evidence cannot be successful – if other previously presented evidence is convincing enough for the court that it could not change its conviction even with the proposed evidence; (6) the court is obliged to present evidence in favor of the accused if the defense explicitly proposes the presentation of evidence and satisfies the burden of proof regarding the existence and material legal relevance of the evidence; (7) as soon as it is shown that the evidence could lead to doubt that, due to the presumption of innocence, would result in an acquittal, the court must accept the evidence proposal and ensure that this aspect of the criminal case is fully investigated; (8) the decision on an evidence proposal is made by the court through diligent, specific, and concrete evidence assessment.

23. The examination of L. L. was proposed with the justification that L. L. was the marketing director of company A. d.d. during the critical period and could explain the company's policy regarding the recognition of super discounts, the purpose and method of determining them, and confirm that mutual claims or obligations between business partners were settled in this way. His examination would have been necessary for assessing the defense arguments regarding the super discounts. The trial court rejected the evidence proposal as unnecessary, with the key justification that the super discount system was not related to the costs of privatizing company B. d.d. and the costs of "parking" MER shares. The Supreme Court has already stated that the evidence procedure in this case revealed that the amount of EUR 690,753.85 was not "closed" with the settlement of super discounts. Therefore, the rejection of the evidence proposal was placed within a comprehensive assessment of the presented evidence, which demonstrated the lack of connection between critical legal transactions and the super discount system, rendering it an insignificant (unsuccessful) evidence proposal. The lower courts (the appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court) thus considered the criteria that emerged in the rejection of evidence proposals based on Article 29 of the Constitution.

24. The same applies to the decision to reject the evidence proposal for the examination of M. M., who, as a former mayor and a member of the management board of F., could explain the importance of the volleyball club for the local and wider area, the method of obtaining funds for the club, and the role of company A. d.d. as the main sponsor. The trial court expressed its opinion that the importance of F. for the local community and the role of the aggrieved company in sponsoring it had been established in the evidence procedure, and these were general knowledge facts, so the execution of the proposed evidence was unnecessary. Regardless of the finding that it was proven in the proceedings that the amount of EUR 815,000.00 was not intended for the sponsorship of the volleyball club, the substance of the substantiated evidence proposal does not demonstrate the legal relevance of the proposed evidence. The petitioner's argument that the evidence proposal was made in a "broader" sense, i.e., in terms of finding additional financial resources for F. during the critical period, does not step away from generalization.

25. The examination of the (undefined) "former stockbrokers at Hypo Bank" was proposed with the justification that they would "explain in more detail" the procedures for transferring ownership or rights over shares in Liechtenstein, where the concept of a trading account is not known, and ownership of shares is recorded as the right to possession. The trial court rejected the evidence proposal as the substantive and legal importance was not demonstrated, and it was not clear which specific (legally relevant) facts would be determined through the examination of the stockbrokers. The Supreme Court accepts such reasoning. The guilty verdict of the final judgment accuses the defendant of knowing that companies B. d.d. and C. d.o.o. did not transact with company D.; the option agreements related to the demonstrated trading of ZVTG, ECEG, and ELOG shares, based on which the amount of EUR 815,000.00 was transferred to Liechtenstein, were fictitious. The issue of "non-registration of shares in a trading account" of company D., which the petitioner tries to establish as legally relevant for the evidence proposal, is irrelevant to the decision in the case. The fact that company D. was not registered as a securities holder in the Central Securities Clearing Corporation (KDD) negates the contrary finding in the option agreements.

B-4.

26. In challenging the conviction for the offense under Article 245 of the Penal Code-1, the defense first argues that the alleged actions of the defendant under point I/2 of the verdict represent an apparent ideal concurrence with the offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code-1 under point I/1 of the verdict, i.e., due to the relationship of consumption. This refers to the relationship between offenses in which a logical comparison of the legal elements at an abstract level establishes that the criminal quantity of one offense (in this case, under Article 245 of the Penal Code-1) is encompassed within the criminal quantity of the other offense (under Article 240 of the Penal Code-1). The defense highlights the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case I Ips 266/2008,42 which, among other things, indicates that the assessment of concurrence between two offenses must be conducted by comparing the legal descriptions of the offenses (which may not necessarily be the same but can be of the same type) on an abstract level, rather than evaluating a specific real-life case.

27. The examination of the presented arguments reveals that the so-formulated statements of the defense do not align with the text of the second paragraph of Article 245 of the Penal Code-1, which implies the so-called dual criminality. This means that even the perpetrator or participant in the so-called predicate offense, from which the money or property originates, is criminally liable for the offense under Article 245 of the Penal Code-1 if they fulfill the legal elements of money laundering both objectively and subjectively.43 As for the defense's abstract questioning of the so-called subsequent non-criminal act, the decisive factor is the identity of the legally protected interest. An ideal concurrence occurs when the perpetrator merely continues the attack on the legally protected interest. The subsequent act must not cause new harm to the legally protected interest, which means that the subsequent act cannot be non-criminal if it can be evaluated as a new attack on the interest,44 especially if it involves an attack on a different legally protected interest than the previously dominant criminal offense. The offense under Article 245 of the Penal Code-1, in relation to the so-called predicate offense, represents a typical example of the difference in legally protected interests. In money laundering, the aim is not only to protect property but primarily to safeguard the lawful and smooth functioning of the financial and economic system.45 These are also the reasons of the trial court46 that the petitioner unjustifiably challenges.

28. The petitioner claims a violation of the principle of legality under Article 28 of the Constitution by arguing that the description of the act under point I/2 of the verdict does not contain the legal elements of the offense under Article 245 of the Penal Code-1. It is a mere description of two transactions or "simple expenditure of funds," namely, the transfer of the amount of EUR 720,000.00 from the account of company D. to the account of Hypo Alpe Adria Bank d.d. Ljubljana in favor of company E. d.o.o., and the subsequent withdrawal of cash in the amount of EUR 90,000.00 from the account of company D. The petitioner asserts that the expenditure of funds does not necessarily imply concealing the origin of the money. At most, it represents the final phase of carrying out the predicate offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code-1, specifically dealing with unlawfully obtained property benefit.

29. The defendant was found guilty as the perpetrator of the predicate offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code-1. As a result of the commission of the offense under point I/1 of the verdict, company D. obtained an illicit property benefit of EUR 815,000.00. The subsequent use (part) of the property benefit in economic activities (transfer of EUR 720,000.00 to the account of Hypo Alpe Adria Bank d.d.) and the disposal of EUR 90,000.00 in cash, which are both forms of committing the offense under the first paragraph of Article 245 of the Penal Code-1, according to the Supreme Court's assessment, in both cases, constitute objectively capable concealing of the illegal origin of money or funds acquired by company D. When it comes to offenses under Articles 240 and 245 of the Penal Code-1, they are separate offenses in this case, with the offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code-1 already completed before the commencement of the execution of the legal elements of the offense under Article 245 of the Penal Code-1. Thus, the actions attributed to the defendant under point I/2 of the verdict do not, in substance, constitute a (further) constituent part of the offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code-1. The essence of the accusation against the defendant under point I/2 of the verdict is not the expenditure of the property benefit obtained by company D., for which he was the economic beneficiary, but rather the concealment of the true origin of the funds, partly through the transfer of funds to the sphere of another legal entity and partly through the disposal of cash resulting from the withdrawal, both of which exceed the criminal quantity within the scope of Article 240 of the Penal Code-1.

30. The Supreme Court has already ruled on several occasions47 that the perpetrator also fulfills the legal elements of the offense of money laundering through transfers within the banking system. Similarly, it has established that the transfer of illicit property benefit to a bank account (of a company) does not exclude the possibility that the same funds subsequently become the subject of the offense of money laundering, which is also true in the present case, where the defendant, through instructions to the authorized person F. F., achieved the channeling (part) of the funds into economic activities (based on the agreement between companies E. d.o.o. and D. regarding ELOG and ECEG shares, which he prepared himself), thereby obstructing the determination of the illegal origin of the funds. Any (further) transfer to another bank account, claiming it is a "regular transfer," hampers the determination of the origin of the money and also impedes the traceability of the cash flow. Such view is consistent with the definition in the first indent of the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act, which states that money laundering is any act with money obtained through a criminal offense, involving any transfer of money derived from a criminal offense. The instructions of the defendant F. F. to ensure the withdrawal of cash, which he then personally received from the courier, represent a blatant execution method for achieving impossible traceability of cash. The trial court correctly assessed that the description of the act, substantiating the division of the amount of EUR 815,000.00 into two parts and the defined manners, contains all (objective) legal elements of the offense under Article 245 of the Penal Code-1.48

31. The appellate court49 also addressed the issue, concluding that the description of the offense provides a clear concretization of the defendant's acts. Furthermore, it explained that, in both objective and subjective terms, the defendant exceeded the criminal quantity encompassed within the offense under point I/1. Therefore, the violation of the first paragraph of Article 395 of the Criminal Procedure Act (which the petitioner erroneously invokes as a violation under the 11th indent of the first paragraph of Article 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act)50 is not established.

32. The Supreme Court has repeatedly taken the position that the description of the offense in the verdict must substantiate the objective legal elements of the offense with specific life facts and circumstances that externally and objectively define the alleged act. As for the perpetrator's subjective attitude, it is sufficient to refer to the legal elements of the alleged offense, while the circumstances used to prove the subjective attitude belong in the rationale of the judgment. Established case law is unanimous that the facts and circumstances used to prove or infer the existence of internal subjective facts, including the content of the conscious and voluntary component of guilt, do not belong in the description of the offense.51

33. The perpetrator's subjective attitude towards the offense under the first paragraph of Article 245 of the Penal Code-1 must be examined on two levels.52 In addition to being aware that the money (of significant value) originates from a criminal offense, the perpetrator must be aware of concealing the origin of the money while also intending (or at least accepting) the consequence (concealment). The criminal accusation in the challenged final judgment indicates that the defendant knew that the money of significant value was obtained through a criminal offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code-1, as he was a participant (perpetrator) in the offense described under point I/1 of the verdict. Regarding the concretization of the perpetrator's consciousness and will to conceal the origin of the money, it is sufficient, as previously mentioned, for the description of the offense to include objective facts and circumstances that represent a concretization of the abstract factual situation.53 The description of the offense in the final judgment corresponds to this approach since it alleges that the defendant, as the economic beneficiary of company D. (through instructions given to F. F.), used part of the money in economic activities by transferring EUR 720,000.00 to the benefit of company E. d.o.o., and with the withdrawal of EUR 90,000.00 in cash, he disposed of part of the money in an unspecified manner, thereby (through money laundering) concealing the origin of the money. Therefore, all actions that define the alleged offense are objectively described. The petitioner's arguments, where it lacks the definition of the defendant's culpable attitude, cannot be accepted. The description of the offense is perfect as it contains a concretization of all the execution actions that externally define and objectify the circumstances from which it is permissible to infer the defendant's intentional conduct in terms of concealing the illegal origin of the money. The reasons in this regard belong in the rationale of the judgment. The justification for the subjective elements of money laundering arises primarily from points 128, 130, 132, 140-141, 145-146 of the first-instance judgment, where the trial court chronologically elaborated on the development of malpractices in share transactions between companies D. and E. d.o.o.54 and addressed the significance of cash withdrawals. In points 148-150, it succinctly argued for the existence of all the above-explained components of (direct) intent with which the defendant committed the offense under Article 245 of the Penal Code-1.

34. Both the description of the offense under point I/2 of the final judgment and the reasons for the judgment are consistent with the criteria established by existing case law. The existence of the defendant's intention to conceal the origin of the money obtained through a criminal offense under Article 240 of the Penal Code-1 does not require further steps, such as determining where the money ultimately ended up or whether the defendant used (consumed) it. The petitioner's allegations that the funds did not originate from a criminal offense and that the defendant did not intend to conceal the origin of the money do not raise any grounds for filing a motion for the protection of legality since, contrary to the second paragraph of Article 420 of the Criminal Procedure Act, it opposes the established factual situation.

B-5.

35. The petitioner challenges the decision on the property claim, specifically concerning the defendant. It is argued that a court settlement was reached between the defendant and the aggrieved company A. d.d. in an individual labor dispute in case Pd 25/2013 on December 6, 2013. The settlement stipulated, among other things,55 that by signing the court settlement, all disputed relations arising from this labor dispute and all disputed relations arising from the defendant's employment relationship with company A. d.d. were resolved. According to the petitioner, this wording encompasses all claims for damages against the defendant, including the present property claim, so the court had no legal basis to grant the claim. The allegations made in the extraordinary termination of the defendant's employment contract related precisely to the transactions that are the subject of this criminal proceedings. The finding that the aggrieved company learned about the "incriminating transaction" only after the court settlement is irrelevant. The petitioner claims that the reasons of the trial court regarding the decision on the property claim are incomprehensible, while the appellate court's judgment lacks substantive reasons concerning the decisive facts, and therefore, the petitioner asserts the existence of a substantial violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure under the 11th item of the first paragraph of Article 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

36. The trial court stated that a claim for compensation based on the commission of a criminal offense cannot be considered a disputed matter arising from an employment relationship. This means that company A. d.d. is entitled to file a property claim against the defendant.56 The appellate court explained that the defendant's conduct was not part of the concluded court settlement. It stated that the aggrieved company learned about the critical transaction only after the court settlement since the criminal complaint was filed on October 30, 2015.57

37. In deciding on a property claim in an adhesion procedure, which, in substance, involves the inclusion of a civil procedure in the criminal procedure, the criminal court cannot grant the aggrieved party's claim if the aggrieved party would not succeed in a civil action. If it acts otherwise, the decision on the property claim is illegal.58 A court settlement (res transacta) concluded between the same parties in a civil case concerning the same subject matter has the effect of res judicata, meaning the effect of a legally adjudicated matter. According to Article 308 of the Civil Procedure Act (ZPP), the court must, throughout the proceedings and ex officio, be vigilant whether the lawsuit concerns a matter that has been subject to a concluded court settlement. In such a case, the lawsuit must be dismissed, otherwise, a significant violation of the provisions of the civil procedure under the 12th item of the second paragraph of Article 339 of the ZPP is committed.

37. The first-instance court's view that the content of the property claim does not concern a labor dispute is incorrect because the defendant's liability for damages must be assessed based on Article 182 of the valid Employment Relationship Act (ZDR) in force at the time of the commission of the offense, for which the competent labor courts are originally responsible. Undoubtedly, a judicial settlement can also include the resolution of other disputed issues between the parties that were not included in the lawsuit in the labor dispute (second paragraph of Article 306 of the Civil Procedure Act).

38. As a result of the erroneous legal view of the first-instance court, the reasons for the decisive facts that are crucial for determining the validity or invalidity of the property claim were omitted in the challenged first-instance judgment. The key question is whether the property claim asserted by the aggrieved company in this criminal proceeding is covered by "all resolved disputed relations arising from the employment relationship," as stated in the wording of the judicial settlement. A judicial settlement has a mixed nature; it is both a procedural institute and a contract in terms of substantive law. Due to its substantive nature, the rules of contract interpretation, including the interpretation of the contractual cause, apply, providing an answer to the question of why the parties entered into a judicial settlement and what they intended to achieve with the legal relationship they created. The expression "disputed relations arising from the employment relationship" is, on the one hand, general, but on the other hand, it is evidently so controversial that both parties to the adhesion procedure (the aggrieved company and the defendant or defense) attribute different meanings to it. The aggrieved company claims that the judicial settlement does not encompass the property claim, while the defense argues the opposite. A criterion that can be helpful in this regard is clarifying whether the facts underlying the property claim existed before the conclusion of the judicial settlement or whether the defendant's unlawful actions that caused the property damage were known to the aggrieved company at the time of the conclusion of the judicial settlement. In this light, the timing of when the police filed a criminal complaint in the pre-trial proceedings, which the appellate court touches upon, is entirely irrelevant. Therefore, it is true that both the first-instance and appellate judgments lack appropriate reasons regarding the decisive facts for the assessment of the property claim, which constitutes the alleged substantial violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure under the 11th item of the first paragraph of Article 371 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which always results in the annulment of the respective decision.

39. In the course of new decision-making, the first-instance court, i.e., if the consideration of the property claim does not unduly prolong the criminal proceedings (first paragraph of Article 100 of the Criminal Procedure Act), should examine the relevant circumstances that are significant for the decision on the property claim (first paragraph of Article 104 of the Criminal Procedure Act). In light of the above-mentioned guidelines for decision-making, the content of the extraordinary termination of the employment contract dated December 22, 2012 (Article 1) that was submitted by company A. d.d. to the defendant appears important. The criminal court must justify its decision by following the criteria outlined by the Constitutional Court in terms of ensuring the right to a fair trial and equal protection of rights (for both parties to the adhesion procedure) under Article 22 of the Constitution. If the decision on the property claim differs from the challenged judgment or if it is determined that the information in the criminal proceedings does not provide a reliable basis for a complete or partial assessment (second paragraph of Article 105 of the Criminal Procedure Act), it will be necessary to address the application of Articles 74 to 76 of the Criminal Code.

C.

40. For the reasons set out in point B-5 of this judgment, the Supreme Court partially granted the request for legal protection and annulled the challenged final judgment regarding the defendant B. B. in the decision on the property claim, and consequently, also in the decision on the costs of the criminal proceedings regarding the decision on the property claim. The case was returned to the first-instance court for a new decision in this regard (first paragraph of Article 426 of the Criminal Procedure Act). Since the other alleged violations under the first paragraph of Article 421 of the Criminal Procedure Act are not established, and the request for legal protection was also filed in violation of the second paragraph of Article 420 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the Supreme Court rejected the request as unfounded in the remaining part (first paragraph of Article 425 of the Criminal Procedure Act).

The decision was adopted by a majority of votes. Judge Dr. Gorkič voted to partially grant the request for legal protection by amending the challenged judgment in the decision on the property claim to refer the aggrieved company to a civil lawsuit; in the remaining part, he voted to reject the request.

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1 Between the recent judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case number I Ips 56417/2012 of May 7, 2020 (point 7 of the reasoning), and the other decisions of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts mentioned therein.
2 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers I Ips 54937/2013-141 of September 1, 2016, I Ips 28724/2015-186 of June 9, 2016, I Ips 346/2008 of October 23, 2008, and others.
3 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers I Ips 134/2009 of October 29, 2009, and I Ips 85/2009 of May 19, 2011.
4 Korošec D. et al., eds.: Veliki znanstveni komentar posebnega dela KZ-1 (2. knjiga); Uradni list RS in Pravna fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, Ljubljana 2019, pp. 976-977, points 13-14.
5 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers I Ips 141/2006 of May 24, 2007, and I Ips 384/2004 of September 7, 2006.
6 Point 43 of the first-instance judgment.
7 Including company C. d.o.o., which later became the consortium of companies, the acquirers of company B. d.d. (point 19 of the first-instance judgment).
8 With the exception of a small portion, namely 18,850 lots of MER shares (point 40 of the first-instance judgment).
9 For example, judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers III Ips 11/2020 of February 15, 2021, and III Ips 48/2019 of November 19, 2019.
10 Point 20 of the appellate judgment.
11 Kocbek M., ed.: Veliki komentar ZGD-1 (1. knjiga); IUS Software and GV Založba, Ljubljana 2014, pp. 830-836.
12 The moment of the entry into force of the ZGD-1A amendment is not crucial, as argued by the higher court (note as in item 10).
13 Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case number III Ips 136/2009 of September 25, 2012.
14 Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case number I Ips 134/2009 of October 29, 2009.
15 Points 157 and 182 of the first-instance judgment, and point 25 of the appellate judgment.
16 Points 85, 96, 149-150 of the first-instance judgment.
17 Motives are the psychological motivations that guided the perpetrator in the commission of the criminal offense, but these psychological processes are usually not included in the perpetrator's intent (Bavcon L. et al.: Kazensko pravo - splošni del; Uradni list RS, Ljubljana 2013, p. 398).
18 Korošec et al., eds., cited work, pp. 999-1000, points 54-55.
19 Points 26-45 of the first-instance judgment.
20 Points 46-66 of the first-instance judgment.
21 Point 22 of the appellate judgment.
22 For the explained reasons, it is therefore irrelevant whether A. A. and E. E. agreed on the redirection of payment to company D.; the convicted person was the one who knowingly and actively carried out the process, starting with the joint proposal of C. C. There can be no talk of a violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure under point 11 of the first paragraph of Article 371 of the ZKP, as the reasons of the final judgment are not in conflict with the judicial determination of guilt.
23 For example, points 29, 45 of the first-instance judgment.
24 Point 49 of the first-instance judgment.
25 Point 171 of the first-instance judgment, and point 24 of the appellate judgment.
26 Points 67-81 of the first-instance judgment, and points 23, 26-27 of the appellate judgment.
27 Point 79 of the first-instance judgment.
28 Point 42 of the first-instance judgment.
29 Note as in item 27.
30 For example, decisions of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, case numbers U-I-271/08 of March 24, 2011 (point 16), Up-88/05 of June 14, 2007 (point 8), Up-34/93 of June 8, 1995, and other decisions of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts.
31 See judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case number I Ips 1639/2010-94 of January 9, 2014 (point 11).
32 Document numbers 966, 1218.
33 Point 171 of the first-instance judgment.
34 Point 17 of this judgment.
35 Point 28 of the appellate judgment.
36 Note as in item 33.
37 Point 18 of this judgment.
38 Document number 1074.
39 Point 172 of the first-instance judgment.
40 Point 15 of this judgment.
41 For example, points 55, 139 of the first-instance judgment.
42 Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case number I Ips 266/2008 of November 21, 2008.
43 Deisinger M.: Kazenski zakonik - posebni del s komentarjem, sodno prakso in literaturo; Poslovna založba, Maribor 2017, p. 531, point 5.
44 Šepec M., ed.: Kazenski zakonik s komentarjem - splošni del; Lexpera, GV Založba, Ljubljana 2021, pp. 767-768, point 33.
45 Ibid., p. 768, point 34.
46 Point 153 of the first-instance judgment.
47 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers I Ips 46951/2015 of December 2, 2021 (point 14), I Ips 33477/2015 of February 18, 2021 (point 14), I Ips 47710/2014 of November 16, 2020 (point 18), I Ips 59294/2010 of February 5, 2019 (point 15).
48 Point 116 of the first-instance judgment.
49 Point 29 of the appellate judgment.
50 Point 5 of this judgment.
51 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers I Ips 33477/2015 of February 18, 2021 (point 8), I Ips 59294/2010 of February 5, 2019 (point 23), I Ips 19555/2015 of January 26, 2017 (point 3), I Ips 59865/2010 of January 30, 2014 (point 9), I Ips 37772/2010 of June 12, 2013 (point 6), and other cases.
52 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers I Ips 9333/2011 of June 15, 2017 (point 5), I Ips 59865/2010 of January 30, 2014 (point 7).
53 Specifically regarding the criminal offense of money laundering, for example, judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers I Ips 33477/2015 of February 18, 2021, I Ips 33147/2016 of December 23, 2020, I Ips 59294/2010 of February 5, 2019, I Ips 59865/2010 of January 30, 2014.
54 The defendant was closely associated with company E. d.o.o. (point 145), and the company's operations were evidently based on his instructions (point 146).
55 Point 5 of the settlement agreement (appendices B8-B10).
56 Point 198 of the first-instance judgment.
57 Point 30 of the appellate judgment.
58 See judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case number I Ips 57715/2013 of December 16, 2021 (point 22).
59 For example, judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case number VIII Ips 303/2016 of May 23, 2017 (point 12).
60 Ude L.: Civilno procesno pravo; Uradni list RS, Ljubljana 2017, pp. 292-295.
61 For example, judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case number VIII Ips 358/2008 of February 9, 2010 (point 8).
62 Note as in item 57.
63 Document numbers 426-432.
64 Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, case numbers Up-103/14-27 of June 6, 2018 (point 15) and Up-652/16-17 of January 21, 2019 (point 7).

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References:

Republic of Slovenia (RS) - Constitution, Laws, Agreements, Contracts
Criminal Code (2008) - KZ-1 - Article 74, 75, 76, 240, 240/1, 240/2, 245, 245/1, 245/2, 245/3
Code of Criminal Procedure (1994) - ZKP - Article 100, 100/1, 104, 104/1, 105, 105/2
Companies Act (1993) - ZGD - Article 240, 241, 244
Companies Act (2006) - ZGD-1 - Article 247, 248, 251
Civil Procedure Act (1999) - ZPP - Article 306, 306/2, 308, 339, 339/2, 339/2-12
Law of Obligations (2001) - OZ - Article 87

 

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